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ACCESS TO CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY
Pamela Foohey*
INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, each year, about a million households filed
bankruptcy.1 This figure initially may loom large. But when compared to the
one-third of Americans who have fallen behind on debt payments,2 the one in
seven Americans who face debt collection calls every year,3 and the hundreds of
millions of Americans burdened with debt,4 the figure becomes more significant
for its seemingly relative fewness. Financial distress undoubtedly leads people
to seek bankruptcy protection, but the path to filing is more complicated than
mere finances. Indeed, on a purely financial basis, far fewer households than one
might estimate would benefit financially from bankruptcy actually file.5 As with
people’s use of the legal system more generally, whether someone will file
bankruptcy depends on a variety of factors often identified under the umbrella
of “access to justice.”6
*
Associate Professor, Indiana University Maurer School of Law. My thanks to Dalié Jiménez, Jody L.
Madeira, and Christopher Odinet for helpful comments on this Essay, and to the editors of the Emory Bankruptcy
Developments Journal for inviting me to contribute to this symposium on vindicating the rights of consumer
debtors.
1
Caseload Statistics Data Tables, UNITED STATES COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/statisticsreports/caseload-statistics-data-tables. This rough estimate is based on nonbusiness bankruptcy cases
commenced between 2008 and 2017, as reported on Table F-2. Nonbusiness bankruptcy filings peaked in 2010
at about 1.5 million and steadily declined to a low of approximately 770,000 in 2016. See id. This amounts to a
little less than one percent of American households filing bankruptcy per year. See Number of Households in the
U.S. From 1960 to 2016 (in millions), STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/183635/number-ofhouseholds-in-the-us/ (reporting data from the United States Census Bureau).
2
Aimee Picchi, The United States of Indebted America, CBS NEWS MONEYWATCH (Dec. 14, 2017),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/the-united-states-of-indebted-america/.
3
See Delinquent Debt Shrinks While Real Estate Debt Continues to Fall, FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y. (Feb.
27, 2012), https://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/news/research/2012/an120227.html.
4
See Kelley Holland, Eight in 10 Americans Are in Debt: Study, CNBC (July 29, 2015),
https://www.cnbc.com/2015/07/29/eight-in-10-americans-are-in-debt.html (reporting on a Pew Charitable Trust
study which found that for many Americans, debt is burdensome).
5
See Michelle J. White, Why Don’t More Households File Bankruptcy?, 14 J.L. ECON. &
ORGANIZATION 205, 206 (1998) (calculating that at least 15% of households would benefit financially from
filing bankruptcy, while about 1% of households actually file in a given year).
6
“Access to justice” in the context of civil law, which includes bankruptcy, has been described as
focusing “on people’s experiences with civil justice events, organizations, and institutions.” Rebecca L.
Sandefur, Access to Civil Justice and Race, Class, and Gender Inequality, 34 ANN. REV. SOCIOL. 339, 340
(2008). It most often is associated with the delivery of legal services and the dearth of lawyers. See D. James
Greiner, Dalié Jiménez & Lois R. Lupica, Self-Help, Reimagined, 92 IND. L.J. 1119, 1120–21 (2017) (“[T]he
overwhelming majority of human beings . . . who face legal problems in the United States do so . . . without any
form of professional legal assistance”); Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice: An Agenda for Legal Education
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This Essay examines the state of access to justice in the context of consumer
bankruptcy. As with the use of any legal remedy, before turning to bankruptcy,
people first must recognize the relevancy of law, the legal system, and
bankruptcy to help solve their financial problems.7 This aspect of access to
bankruptcy is the least researched, despite being critical to the ultimate delivery
of bankruptcy’s “fresh start.”8
In the Essay’s first part, I summarize research regarding how people decide
to use bankruptcy to address their financial troubles. To shed new light on
bankruptcy’s place in people’s lives, I analyze the narratives accompanying
consumer complaints about financial products and services submitted to the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB).9 These narratives provide a
previously unexplored perspective on how people connect their financial
troubles to the legal solution of filing bankruptcy, both adding to our
understanding of how they come to the legal system and revealing what remains
unknown. With these knowledge gaps in mind, I outline key questions for future
research about how individuals translate their financial problems to legal
problems addressable by filing bankruptcy.
Having decided that filing bankruptcy is the most suitable avenue to deal
with their financial troubles, people must actually be able to file for it to be a
viable solution. The most robust research about access to consumer bankruptcy
focuses on debtors’ multiple barriers to entry. The passage of the Bankruptcy
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA)10 made it
more difficult, expensive, and time-consuming for people to file bankruptcy.11
BAPCPA’s addition of the “means test” created a legal barrier to entry.12
Likewise, BAPCPA’s paperwork and documentation requirements introduced

and Research, 62 J. LEGAL EDUC. 531, 532–33 (2013) (distinguishing access to procedural and substantive
justice). It also encompasses how people decide to use law and the legal system to deal with justiciable problems
in their lives. See infra Part I.
7
See infra Part I.
8
“Fresh start” comes from Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934).
9
This analysis draws on my sample of narratives submitted by consumers that I previously analyzed in
Pamela Foohey, Calling on the CFPB for Help: Telling Stories and Consumer Protection, 80 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 177 (2017) [hereinafter, Foohey, Calling on the CFPB]; see infra notes 81–88 and accompanying text.
10
See generally Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005). The law’s effective date was October 17, 2005.
11
See Angela Littwin, Adapting to BAPCPA, 90 AM. BANKR. L.J. 183, 183–87 (2016) [hereinafter,
Littwin, Adapting] (overviewing BAPCPA’s changes to the Bankruptcy Code that “appeared likely to impair
the consumer bankruptcy system’s ability to function”); Lois R. Lupica, The Consumer Bankruptcy Fee Study:
Final Report, 20 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 17, 27 (2012) (“[O]ne of [BAPCPA’s] stated goals the reduction of
consumer bankruptcy filings.”).
12
11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2012); see also Robert M. Lawless, et al., Did Bankruptcy Reform Fail? An
Empirical Study of Consumer Debtors, 82 AM. BANKR. L.J. 349, 352–53 (2008) (overviewing the “means test”).
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procedural hurdles to filing that deter people from seeking bankruptcy protection
even more so than the means test.13 BAPCPA also imposed more work on
debtors’ attorneys, necessitating that they increase their fees, creating yet
another financial barrier to filing.14
Although BAPCPA decreased access to consumer bankruptcy,15 one oftennoted feature of the bankruptcy system is that regardless of the laws on the
books, attorneys, judges, and trustees play a pivotal role in the system’s success
or failure.16 Attorneys interact the most with people considering bankruptcy,
positioning attorneys as the most important system actors in terms of delivering
access to justice. More than 90% of people who file bankruptcy do so with an
attorney’s assistance,17 meaning that attorneys mediate access to bankruptcy
much more so than in other civil law contexts.18 Attorneys provide their clients
with the information about the benefits and drawbacks to choose between
chapter 7 and chapter 13, the two bankruptcy chapters that consumers most often
use.19 Which chapter households file dictates nearly every aspect of their
experience, from how much they will pay their attorney, to what property they
will keep, to their likelihood of obtaining a discharge of debts.20 Yet research,
including the analyses conducted by my co-investigators and me on the current

13
See Littwin, Adapting, supra note 11, at 191–92 (noting that “it is the procedural barriers BAPCPA
imposed that appear to be having a larger impact” on deterring people from filing bankruptcy than the means
test); Lawless, et al., supra note 12, at 353 (finding that BAPCPA blocks “hundreds of thousands of struggling
families [from bankruptcy] indiscriminately”).
14
See Lupica, supra note 11, at 56, 58, 69, 70 (finding that attorneys’ fees increased by 18% to 48% after
BAPCPA depending on the chapter filed, whether the case resulted in a discharge, and the value of the debtor’s
assets relative to debts); Littwin, Adapting, supra note 11, at 194, 219–24 (findings that “the real harm BAPCPA
caused was through the procedural barriers it created, especially the additional work it imposed on consumer
bankruptcy attorneys” and discussing interviews with debtors’ attorneys about why they raised their fees).
15
See Lawless, et al., supra note 12, at 349–51 (discussing the decline in consumer bankruptcy filings).
16
See Littwin, Adapting, supra note 11, at 188 (commenting that “attorneys, judges, and other system
actors play a protective role” in the bankruptcy system); Angela Littwin, The Affordability Paradox: How
Consumer Bankruptcy’s Greatest Weakness May Account for Its Surprising Success, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1933, 1935 (2011) (noting that “[c]onsumer bankruptcy’s lawyer- and judge-based framework appears to have
shielded it from the worse effects” of BAPCPA’s procedural burdens).
17
Pamela Foohey, Robert M. Lawless, Katherine Porter & Deborah Thorne, “No Money Down”
Bankruptcy, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 1055, 1057 n.2 (2017) [hereinafter, Foohey, et al., No Money Down] (reporting
on data from the Consumer Bankruptcy Project (CBP)).
18
See Lisa Needham, Measuring the Access-to-Justice Gap, LAWYERIST.COM (Aug. 27, 2016),
https://lawyerist.com/measuring-access-to-justice/ (reporting that, based on a sample of ten urban communities,
nearly 70% of all civil cases have an attorney representing only one side).
19
See Foohey, et al., No Money Down, supra note 18, at 1057 (overviewing chapters 7 and 13). More
than 99.5% of households file under chapter 7 or 13. See id. at 1061 n.22.
20
See id. at 1057–58 (noting these differences).
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iteration of the Consumer Bankruptcy Project (CBP),21 shows that the two most
significant predictors of people’s chapter choice are their place of residence and
race, neither of which have anything to do with the substantive legal benefits of
chapter 7 or chapter 13.22 This breakdown of access to justice in the bankruptcy
system has endured for decades.23
In the second part of this Essay, I chronicle the evolution of research
regarding consumer bankruptcy’s “local legal culture,”24 systemic racial bias,
and the link between attorneys’ fees and bankruptcy chapter choice. The data
and literature I analyze in this Essay confirm that “access to justice” and
“consumer bankruptcy” are far from synonymous. At the same time, however,
these resources point toward avenues for future research that promise to improve
bankruptcy’s ability to deliver a fresh start to struggling families.
I.

FROM FINANCIAL PROBLEM TO BANKRUPTCY

As one might expect, households’ finances can predict bankruptcy filings.
The number of consumer bankruptcy filings fluctuates year to year in part based
on a function of outstanding consumer debt and people’s income.25 But simply
because people experience financial distress does not mean that they all will file
bankruptcy.26 Some debts, such as student loans, are effectively nondischargeable, making filing futile.27 Some people’s financial situations are so
21
The CBP is a multi-researcher effort that investigates the people who file bankruptcy. The other coinvestigators on the CBP’s current iteration are Robert Lawless, Katherine Porter, and Deborah Thorne. At
present, the CBP’s current iteration includes people who filed bankruptcy between 2013 and 2016. For details
about the CBP, see id. at 1071–74.
22
See id. at 1059–60.
23
See Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren, & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Persistence of Local Legal
Culture: Twenty Years of Experience from the Federal Bankruptcy Courts, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 801,
806–07 (1994) (noting the “pervasive, systematic influence” of attorneys and judges on variations not tied to
economic or state legal differences in case outcomes across the consumer bankruptcy system); infra Part II.
24
Sullivan, et al., supra note 23, at 804 (defining bankruptcy’s “local legal culture” as “systematic and
persistent variation in local legal practices as a consequence of a complex of perceptions and expectations shared
by many practitioners and officials in a particular locality, and differing in identifiable ways from the practices,
perceptions and expectations existing in other localities subject to the same or a similar formal legal regime”).
25
Bob Lawless, Bankruptcies Down 12% in 2014, Forecast Predicts the Same Decline for 2015, CREDIT
SLIPS (Jan. 8, 2015), http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2015/01/bankruptcies-down-12-in-2014-forecastpredicts-the-same-for-2015.html (detailing “a mathematical model that . . . does a good job of capturing the
variation in bankruptcy filing rates”).
26
See Richard M. Hynes, Broke but Not Bankrupt: Consumer Debt Collection in State Courts, 60 FLA.
L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2008) (discussing how bankruptcy filings provide an “incomplete measure of consumer financial
distress”).
27
See Xiaoling Ang & Dalié Jimenez, Private Student Loans and Bankruptcy: Did Four-Year
Undergraduates Benefit from the Increased Collectability of Student Loans?, in STUDENT LOANS AND THE
DYNAMICS OF DEBT (Kevin Hollenbeck & Brad Hershbein eds., 2015) (overviewing the history of the
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dire that bankruptcy laws offer little benefit, which is why bankruptcy largely is
a middle class phenomenon.28 In short, households’ use of bankruptcy as a legal
remedy is dependent on more than the figures on their balance sheets.29
To evaluate access to consumer bankruptcy, the first inquiry must be how
people determine that their serious financial problems can be remedied by filing
bankruptcy. Lawyers naturally tend to see law everywhere. They not only
recognize that many events in people’s everyday lives are problems with legal
solutions, but they also think that legal action might be useful. The same is not
true for laypeople, even though Americans are noted for their litigious nature.30
Instead, for most people, the justiciable problems in their lives remain “alegal.”31
They may try to solve these problems on their own, may turn to third parties for
help, or may simply ignore them, taking no action at all.32 Eventually, some
people determine that the worrisome situations in their lives should be addressed
by invoking law.33

dischargeability of student loans and studies of the percentage of debtors who successfully discharge their
student loans); Rafael I. Pardo, The Undue Hardship Thicket: On Access to Justice, Procedural Noncompliance,
and Pollutive Litigation in Bankruptcy, 66 FLA. L. REV. 2101, 2103–05 (2014) (focusing on the difficulties in
demonstrating the “undue hardship” necessary to discharge student loan debt).
28
See Pamela Foohey, Robert M. Lawless, Katherine Porter, & Deborah Thorne, Life in the Sweatbox,
94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. __, (forthcoming 2018) (available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=3126901) [hereinafter Foohey, et al., Sweatbox] (reporting based on CBP’s current iteration
that “bankruptcy filers still have many characteristics of the American middle class, as they did in the 2007 CBP
and prior iterations of the CBP”).
29
See Stephanie Wilshusen, Meeting the Demand for Debt Relief, FED. RES. BANK OF PHILA. (Aug. 2011),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1908334 (discussing options available to consumers to manage debts).
30
See Rebecca L. Sandefur, The Fulcrum Point of Equal Access to Justice: Legal and Nonlegal
Institutions of Remedy, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 949, 950 (2009) [hereinafter, Sandefur, Fulcrum Point] (contrasting
how “justice scholars and practicing attorneys” and laypeople think about civil justice problems); Rebecca L.
Sandefur, The Importance of Doing Nothing: Everyday Problems and the Importance of Inaction, in
TRANSFORMING LIVES: LAW AND SOCIAL PROCESS 112, 112 (Pascoe Pleasence, Alexy Buck & Nigel J. Balmer
eds., 2007) [hereinafter, Sandefur, Importance of Doing Nothing] (“Americans are noted for their willingness to
press claims when they feel they have been wronged.”).
31
See Sandefur, Importance of Doing Nothing, supra note 30, at 113 (defining justiciable problems as
“circumstances that people experience as troubling and that raise civil legal issues, though they are not
necessarily best solved or only remediable through use of law”); Sandefur, Fulcrum Point, supra note 30, at 953
(“A pattern of pervasive alegality characterizes how ordinary people across societies handle their own everyday
civil justice problems.”).
32
See Sandefur, Importance of Doing Nothing, supra note 30, at 112–14 (nothing that “[f]or roughly a
quarter of justiciable problems, low- and moderate-income Americans in the most recent national survey
reported taking no action at all to attempt to resolve the situation” and discussing what else people may do to
deal with justiciable problems).
33
This is a complex process described by the “naming, blaming, claiming” framework. William L.F.
Felsiner, et al., The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming . . ., 15 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 631, 644–47 (1980).
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How people respond to civil legal problems in general depends significantly
on how these problems are socially constructed.34 An individual’s understanding
of appropriate responses to particular events and situations is colored by both
enduring factors, such as upbringing, and more transitory experiences, like
conversations with family, friends, and neighbors.35 Addressing a justiciable
problem through the legal system also requires action. Even if someone
abstractly understands law’s relevance, she must have the time and motivation
to advocate for herself, with or without an attorney’s aid. But for many people,
particularly low- and moderate-income individuals, day-to-day struggles to
provide for themselves and their families capture their time and attention,
creating a condition of scarcity.36 Recent research shows that time and money
scarcity overtax people’s mental “bandwidth,” decreasing their ability to attend
to other issues that require advanced planning, such as taking legal action.37
Nervousness, fear, and related concerns associated with unfamiliarity with
the legal system may further decrease someone’s motivation to use time and
resources to deal with a justiciable issue.38 Although lack of money or the cost
of legal services are important, they are not leading reasons why people do not
turn to law to resolve problems.39 Combined, few people mobilize their legal

34
See Rebecca L. Sandefur, Money Isn’t Everything: Understanding Moderate Income Households’ Use
of Lawyers’ Services, in MIDDLE INCOME ACCESS TO JUSTICE 222, 232 (Anthony Duggan, et al., eds. 2012)
[hereinafter, Sandefur, Money Isn’t Everything] (“The legal nature of any given civil justice problem is not a
self-evident fact; rather, it is socially constructed.”); THOMAS LUCKMANN & PETER L. BERGER, THE SOCIAL
CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY (1966) (introducing the term “social construction”).
35
See Sandefur, Money Isn’t Everything, supra note 34, at 232 (discussing how people characterize their
problems).
36
See Greiner, et al., supra note 6, at 1128 (discussing the scarcity in the context of people being sued in
state court for delinquent debts).
37
See id. at 1128–29 (discussing how scarcity may affect the “goal identification, goal pursuit,
persistence, plan making, plan-implementation strategies, and self-control” necessary for people to engage with
the legal system); SENDHIL MULLAINATHAN & ELDAR SHAFIR, SCARCITY: WHY HAVING TOO LITTLE MEANS SO
MUCH 157–58 (2013) (explaining that low bandwidth “means that you have fewer mental resources to assert
self-control”).
38
See Greiner, et al., supra note 6, at 1129–30 (noting that people dealing with debt collection lawsuits
often cite anxiety and feelings of threat when asked about the lawsuits, and that the “mundane details of how the
formal legal system works” may intimidate laypeople); Sandefur, Importance of Doing Nothing, supra note 30,
at 123–24 (finding that people fail to take action because of shame, “a sense of insufficient power,” and
“frustrated resignation”).
39
See Sandefur, Money Isn’t Everything, supra note 34, at 244 (concluding that “the costs of lawyers’
services may play some role in explaining why justice problems are seldom taken to attorneys, but that other
more important factors are also at play”); Sandefur, Fulcrum Point, supra note 30, at 953–54 (noting “that people
sometimes do nothing about serious civil justice problems, even when taking action would cost them no
money”); infra note 114 and accompanying text.
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rights, and most civil justice problems remain outside the legal system.40 Those
few who decide to take legal action then must choose a particular legal solution
and find an attorney. Research shows that people accomplish this through a
process termed “social searching,” wherein they rely on their social networks—
family, friends, neighbors—for information about legal actions and referrals to
attorneys.41
A. Coming to Bankruptcy
Little systematic research exists about how people come to view their
financial problems as legal problems and then decide to deal with them by filing
bankruptcy. Most research on these processes involves surveys and interviews
completed by people who have filed bankruptcy or by debtors’ attorneys. The
results of these studies support the more general findings detailed above about
the social construction of civil legal problems and people’s tendency to do
nothing in response to issues. For example, attorneys term consumers’
propensity to put off filing bankruptcy the “ostrich defense.”42 People stick their
heads in the sand and hope that their financial problems will go away—that is,
they do nothing.43
Research from the CBP confirms that people seriously struggle with their
debts for years before they file bankruptcy. Data from the CBP’s latest iteration
(“Current CBP”) show that two-thirds of debtors report struggling for two or
more years before filing.44 One-third state that they struggled for more than five
years before filing.45 Attorneys’ reports corroborate debtors’ responses of their
lengthy financial struggles. When debtors finally file bankruptcy, they tell their
attorneys that they should have done so years before.46
40
See Pamela Foohey, When Faith Falls Short: Bankruptcy Decisions of Churches, 76 OHIO ST. L. REV.
1319, 1325 (2015) [hereinafter, Foohey, When Faith Falls Short] (overviewing research about how people
decide to pursue legal remedies); Richard O. Lempert, Mobilizing Private Law: An Introductory Essay, 11 LAW
& SOC’Y REV. 173, 173 (1976) (defining mobilization of the law as the “process by which legal norms are
invoked to regulate behavior”).
41
See Sandefur, Money Isn’t Everything, supra note 34, at 222 (detailing “social searching”).
42
See Ronald J. Mann & Katherine Porter, Saving Up For Bankruptcy, 98 GEO. L.J. 289, 313 (2010)
(discussing interviews with bankruptcy attorneys).
43
See id. (“Most debtors do not immediately recognize the consequences of their financial plight.”); Jean
Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy: One Code, Many Cultures, 67 AM. BANKR. L.J. 501, 541 (1993)
(noting attorney statements that “[m]any debtors struggle with huge debts for a long time before visiting a
bankruptcy lawyer”).
44
Foohey, et al., Sweatbox, supra note 28, at __.
45
Id. at __. Data from the CBP’s prior iterations likewise show that debtors report struggling with their
debts for years before filing. See Lawless, et al., supra note 12, at 381 (reporting on data from the 2001 and 2007
CBPs).
46
Mann & Porter, supra note 42, at 314 (discussing interviews with debtors’ attorneys).
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During the years that bankruptcy debtors struggle, they report going without
necessities, such as food and healthcare, losing their property in foreclosure
actions, selling other property, and trying to work out deals with their creditors.47
These privations and coping techniques suggest that people’s financial problems
remain alegal for a significant time.48 People also view filing bankruptcy as
shameful, which may blind people from thinking of bankruptcy—or law at all—
as an appropriate response to financial problems.49 The Current CBP
questionnaire asks debtors about their feelings upon filing bankruptcy and
provides them with a list of major emotions.50 More than two-thirds (68%) of
debtors reported that they felt shame upon filing.51 Other qualitative studies of
people who have filed bankruptcy likewise find that most debtors file while
feeling shame and that bankruptcy remains stigmatized.52 If anything,
bankruptcy may have become more stigmatized in recent years than in prior
decades.53
In short, most people who file bankruptcy do not decide to file in “frantic
acts of desperation.”54 Neither do they file “bankruptcies of convenience,”
carefully timed after they run up debts with the understanding that they can and
likely will file.55 Rather, research suggests that most people go through an

47

Foohey, et al., Sweatbox, supra note 28, at __.
See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
49
Research regarding how people deal with money issues other than invoking the legal solutions of filing
bankruptcy similarly shows that they opt not to deal with the problems, even when the issues threatened their
credit worthiness and solvency, because, among other reasons, they were embarrassed and ashamed about their
problems. See Sandefur, Fulcrum Point, supra note 30, at 953–55.
50
Foohey, et al., Sweatbox, supra note 28, at __. For details about basic and other major emotions, see
Foohey, Calling on the CFPB, supra note 9, at 189–90.
51
Foohey, et al., Sweatbox, supra note 28, at __.
52
See Deborah Thorne & Leon Anderson, Managing the Stigma of Personal Bankruptcy, 39 SOC. FOCUS
77, 77, 86–87 (2006) (describing how couples reported postponing filing for months or even years to avoid the
stigma of bankruptcy and hiding their bankruptcies post-filing from relatives and friends because of fear of
stigmatization); Michael D. Sousa, Bankruptcy Stigma: A Socio-Legal Study, 87 AM. BANKR. L.J. 435, 463–69
(2013) (reporting that results of interviews with consumers who filed under chapter 7 between 2006 and 2010
and finding that some people avoided filing for bankruptcy because of its stigma and the shame they felt more
generally about incurring debts they could not pay).
53
See Michael D. Sousa, Persistence of Bankruptcy Stigma, 26 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. (forthcoming
2018) (exploring bankruptcy stigma for approximately four decades based on General Social Survey and finding
that the consumer bankruptcy’s stigma seems to have increased over time); Teresa A. Sullivan, et al., Less Stigma
or More Financial Distress: An Empirical Analysis of the Extraordinary Increase in Bankruptcy Filings, 59
STAN L. REV. 213, 233–47 (2006) (refuting the declining stigma hypothesis and arguing that growing number
of households are in financial trouble, but less are filing, which may mean that bankruptcy’s stigma has
increased).
54
Mann & Porter, supra note 42, at 313.
55
Ronald J. Mann, Bankruptcy Reform and the “Sweatbox” of Credit Card Debt, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV.
375, 376–77 (discussing characterization of people who file bankruptcy).
48

FOOHEY GALLEYPROOFS

2018]

6/14/2018 3:37 PM

ACCESS TO CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY

349

“internal reckoning” about the severity of their financial situation, often only
recognizing the need for legal action after resigning themselves to the dire state
of their financial lives.56
For those people who file bankruptcy, creditors’ attempts to collect debts,
such as phone calls or filing collection suits in state court, may spur them to
consider the seriousness of their financial situations. The Current CBP
questionnaire also asks debtors their reasons for filing bankruptcy and lists
eleven “things,” including pressure from debt collectors.57 Three-quarters of
debtors cited pressure from debt collectors as a reason that they turned to
bankruptcy.58 Prior studies based on interviews with people who filed
bankruptcy likewise found that creditors’ sustained debt collection efforts
encourage people to take legal action to deal with financial issues.59 In this way,
outside pressures may help to remove the alegality of financial troubles,
transforming them into legal issues.
Finally, to get from financial problem to filing bankruptcy, people must
decide that seeking bankruptcy protection is a suitable legal solution. Even less
empirical research exists about the sub-question of how people decide upon the
specific legal option of bankruptcy. The most applicable studies consider the
effects of “social spillover” on consumer bankruptcy filings,60 based upon the
“social searching” theory of how people come to connect with lawyers and the
legal system.61 “Social spillover” refers to neighbors’ actions influencing
people’s decisions, even if they do not discuss law or using the legal system with
others directly.62 In the context of consumer bankruptcy, studies suggest that
filing rates increase in a given year if filing rates increased in the same
geographic location in the prior year. Scholars link this increase to both diffusion
of information about bankruptcy and a decline in the perceived stigma of filing
bankruptcy.63
56

Mann & Porter, supra note 42, at 316–18 (overviewing this “internal reckoning”).
Foohey, et al., Sweatbox, supra note 28, at __.
58
Id. at __.
59
See Mann & Porter, supra note 42, at 315–18 (describing the “grinding psychological toll” of debt
collection and noting that “[b]ankruptcies occur only after consumers have endured a lengthy period of collection
pressure”); Thorne & Anderson, supra note 52, at 86–87 (detailing how debtors avoided bill collectors).
60
See Ethan Cohen-Cole & Burca Duygan-Bump, Household Bankruptcy Decision: The Role of Social
Stigma vs. Information Sharing (Fed. Res. Bank of Boston, Working Paper No. QAU08-6, 2008); Astrid Dick,
Andreas Lenhert, & Giorgio Topa, Social Spillovers in Personal Bankruptcies (June 2008), https://www.
newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/economists/topa/DLT_062808.pdf; Foohey, When Faith Falls
Short, supra note 40, at 1329–30 (discussing these studies).
61
See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
62
See Foohey, When Faith Falls Short, supra note 40, at 1329 (defining “social spillover”).
63
See id. at 1329–30 (overviewing these studies).
57
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In my research into religious organizations’ chapter 11 bankruptcy cases, I
directly asked leaders about how they decided to invoke law generally and use
the legal solution of bankruptcy.64 Although these leaders (often church pastors)
filed business bankruptcy cases on behalf of their organizations, the timing of
the filings track with consumer bankruptcy filings,65 likely making the pattern
of religious organizations’ filings relevant to consumer filings. Religious leaders
also described a process of conceptualizing their organizations’ financial
problems as legal problems, consistent with studies of how other people come
to the bankruptcy system. Like consumers, religious leaders ignored the
financial problems, discussed what to do about their predicaments with their
social networks, and often ultimately recognized the legal nature of their
organizations’ financial problems through creditors’ collection attempts or
creditors’ recommendations to consider filing bankruptcy.66
As “social searching” theory would predict, leaders recounted learning
details about bankruptcy and finding attorneys through the leaders’ social
networks.67 Religious organizations’ attorneys likewise hypothesized that
networks among churches and other religious organizations brought them
clients.68 Indeed, religious organizations’ cases filed in the past decade clumped
in particular districts, with more than half of the cases originating in ten out of a
possible ninety districts, and a few attorneys representing a sizable proportion
of the cases filed in some of those ten districts.69 This clumping further suggests
that social searching and spillover effects drive bankruptcy filings, in line with
research about how people generally mobilize their legal rights.
How religious organizations’ leaders decided to file chapter 11 exposes a
significant hole in our knowledge about how people come to the bankruptcy
system that is essential to evaluating access to consumer bankruptcy. There is a
dearth of research that directly asks people how they chose bankruptcy from the
menu of available legal responses to financial troubles. However, there is a more
cavernous (albeit understandable) gap in research about people’s road to
bankruptcy. Little research focuses on those people who struggle with their
finances but do not turn to bankruptcy.

64

Id. at 1334–45 (discussing the study’s methodology).
Id. at 1339, figure 1 (comparing religious organizations’ chapter 11 filings to filings of chapter 7 and
13 cases with predominately consumer debts).
66
Id. at 1345–50.
67
Id. at 1350.
68
Id. at 1351.
69
Id. at 1335–37 (discussing the clumping of religious organizations’ chapter 11 cases).
65
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One reaction to research findings about how long debtors struggle with their
financial problems before filing bankruptcy is a concern that people wait an
unduly long time to file. By the time many households file, the financial benefits
of bankruptcy almost undoubtedly outweigh the costs.70 While people struggle,
they seem to deplete not only their financial resources, but also their emotional
and physical well-being.71 Yet, people who do not file might successfully
address their problems in other ways. Or financial problems’ shame and stigma
(which is more cursorily explored in scholarship than bankruptcy’s stigma)
might prevent people from dealing with their problems at all.72 Or individuals
may take other legal action to deal with their financial problems, only to find
these solutions ineffective.
B. Discussing Financial Problems and Bankruptcy in Complaints to CFPB
An easily-accessed data source that may begin to answer questions about
how appropriate responses to financial problems are socially construed is the
CFPB’s complaint database. One of the CFPB’s statutorily-prescribed functions
is to collect, monitor, and respond to consumers’ complaints regarding financial
products and services.73 To collect complaints, the CFPB established an
interactive webpage.74 When consumers submit complaints via the webpage,
they have the option to write narratives describing their problems, and can also
choose to allow the CFPB to make their complaints public through its consumer
complaint database.75 From December 2011, when the CFPB began collecting
complaints that are publicly downloadable, to the end of January 2018,
consumers submitted over 956,000 complaints online.76 One-quarter of these
70

See Foohey, et al., Sweatbox, supra note 28, at __; supra note 5.
See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
72
Perhaps the most prominent study of people struggling with debt who did not file bankruptcy is based
on interviews with people who enrolled in Debtors Anonymous. See generally Terrell A. Hayes, Stigmatizing
Indebtedness: Implications for Labeling Theory, 23 SYMBOLIC INTERACTION 29 (2000); see also Brent T. White,
Take This House and Shove It: The Emotional Drives of Strategic Default, 63 SMU L. REV. 1279, 1280–82
(2010) (interviewing 350 individuals about their decision-making process to stop paying mortgages for houses
on which they owed more than the house itself was worth, which, on a financial basis, likely would be beneficial,
and finding that their decisions were more “driven by emotional matters” than economically rational); Brent T.
White, Underwater and Not Walking Away: Shame, Fear and the Social Management of the Housing Crisis, 45
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 971 (2010) (relying on the same interviews to find that people did not walk away from
underwater homes until long after it would have been financially beneficial); supra note 49.
73
See Foohey, Calling on the CFPB, supra note 9, at 177 (discussing this function).
74
Submit A Complaint, CFPB, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/complaint/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2018).
75
Consumer Complaint Database, CFPB, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/data-research/consumercomplaints/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2018).
76
This figure is based on a download of the entire database on February 2, 2018. See id. The CFPB began
making the complaint database available to the public in June 2012. See Foohey, Calling on the CFPB, supra
note 9, at 183–84. The CFPB also allows consumers to submit complaints via telephone, mail, email, or fax.
71
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submissions include narratives that consumers allowed the CFPB to make
public.77 This amounts to over 5,000 complaint narratives published each
month.78
These narratives provide some of the first data about how people express
their financial problems and how they think about solutions to those issues in a
context not linked to bankruptcy. Although there are obvious limitations to this
data source,79 it still offers an initial glimpse of how people think about money
troubles and legal problems. There is a significant hole in research about how
people deal with their finances because it is especially difficult to identify and
gain access to a relevant group of people with financial problems, apart from
relying on public records of who has filed bankruptcy.80 By lodging complaints
through the CFPB, people self-identify as being in financial distress or as having
an issue with a financial product or service sufficiently severe to merit
complaint.
In my prior work, I analyzed a random sample of 6,000 complaints with
narratives submitted between May 1, 2015 and April 30, 2016.81 The goal of that
analysis was to examine the complaint mechanism’s role in helping people
“voice, solve, and come to terms with” their financial problems, and compare
the results to the CFPB’s envisioned role of taking and processing complaints.82
Given my focus on people’s lived experiences with financial problems, as
expressed through the narratives they wrote, I used qualitative content analysis
by way of a coding frame based on major emotions expressed to analyze the
narratives.83 Together with research assistants (to provide inter-coder
reliability), I read each narrative to identify language expressing anger,
About 55% of complaints are submitted through the CFPB’s website. See id. at 178 n.6 (discussing submitting
complaints).
77
This figure is based on a download of the entire database on February 2, 2018. See Consumer Complaint
Database, supra note 75. According to the CFPB, 59% of consumers choose to make their narratives public.
The lower percentage of complaints with published narratives is a result of when the CFPB began asking
consumers if they assented to their narratives being made public, with the idea that it would later debut “an
enhanced public-facing consumer complaint database.” Foohey, Calling on the CFPB, supra note 9, at 183–84.
78
See Foohey, Calling on the CFPB, supra note 9, at 178.
79
See id. at 184–86 (discussing the data’s limitations).
80
For instance, Terrell Hayes leveraged Debtors Anonymous rosters. See supra note 72. Debt collection
proceedings may provide another venue to draw a sample of financially-distressed individuals. See D. James
Greiner, et al., Improving the Lives of Individuals in Financial Distress Using a Randomized Control Trial: A
Research and Clinical Approach, 20 GEO. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 449, 450–51 (2013) (proposing a randomized
control trial involving people named as defendants in debt collection lawsuits).
81
Foohey, Calling on the CFPB, supra note 9, at 186–89 (discussing sampling, sample characteristics,
and comparing the sample to overall complains submitted via the CFPB).
82
Id. at 178.
83
Id. at 189 (discussing qualitative content analysis).
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frustration, disgust, sadness, fear, shame, and guilt.84 I also created variables to
assess whether consumers were directing their complaints to the CFPB or the
financial company, and whether consumers discussed law in their complaints.85
In brief, I found that people’s narratives expressed one of two sentiments:
anger and frustration about a company’s practices, or sadness and fear about
how a company’s practices negatively affected their lives. When people
expressed anger and frustration, they more often raised legal claims and asked
the CFPB to investigate the company generally.86 When people expressed
sadness and fear, they more often pleaded with the CFPB for individualized
help—help which the CFPB is not equipped to provide.87 With this in mind, I
identified new ways that the CFPB and other agencies with similar complaint
mechanisms may help people in need that turn to them for assistance, including
encouraging these individuals to think of their issues as legal problems.88
As relevant to this Essay, when I initially analyzed the sample of narratives,
I also created a variable for instances in which narratives mentioned bankruptcy.
When combined with my other data, these narratives may offer a window into
how people construct their financial problems as legal problems addressable, in
part, by bankruptcy. Few of the sampled narratives discussed law or bankruptcy,
which aligns with research showing that people often do not think of their
problems as legally addressable. Nine percent of the narratives asserted alleged
violations of federal and state laws, such as the Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act (FDCPA) and the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA),89 and four percent
mentioned bankruptcy.90 Less than one percent both discussed bankruptcy and
alleged a legal violation.91
Those narratives that cited both bankruptcy and another law predominately
alleged violations of FDCPA and FCRA for creditors’ attempts to collect debt
that consumers thought had been discharged through their bankruptcy cases, or
for including information on credit reports that consumers believed was
inaccurate. In three-fourths of the narratives in which consumers discussed

84

Id. at 189–91 (discussing major emotions and coding strategy).
Id. at 191–93 (detailing these variables).
86
Id. at 192; see also id. at 182–83 (discussing how the CFPB responds to complaints).
87
Id. at 178 (summarizing the results).
88
Id. at 207–09 (discussing the results).
89
Id. at 200.
90
264 (4.4%) of the 6,000 narratives mentioned bankruptcy. See generally Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1681 (2012); Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (2012).
91
37 (0.6%) of the 6,000 narratives mentioned both bankruptcy and another law. See generally Fair Credit
Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012); Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (2012).
85
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bankruptcy, they asked that information be removed from credit reports or
requested that debt collectors stop calling them, their relatives, and their
employers about purportedly discharged debts.92
Many of the remaining narratives in which consumers brought up
bankruptcy—15% of all narratives mentioning bankruptcy—speak to people’s
paths considering debts financial problems to issues properly addressed through
bankruptcy. Consumers usually recounted their financial difficulties and related
life problems that motivated them either to be “forced to” file bankruptcy93 or to
consider filing bankruptcy in the near future.94 These consumers’ stories reflect
a journey to bankruptcy that included trying to solve their problems by working
with creditors, looking for more or new work, appealing to others for help, and
eventually realizing the necessity of bankruptcy or other legal action.95
Corroborating research about people choosing legal solutions and being
aware of bankruptcy’s stigma, consumers sometimes provided rationalizations
for financial troubles and bankruptcy filings. For instance, narratives included
consumers’ statements that they “first and foremost” tried to pay their
creditors,96 that their creditors “caused” them to file because of continuing
threats,97 that they were “good” people, and that bankruptcy was a last-ditch

92
196 of the 264 narratives mentioned bankruptcy discuss debt collection or credit reporting issues postbankruptcy. A portion of the other narratives that mentioned bankruptcy recounted specifics of bankruptcy cases,
often reaffirmations. See generally Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012); Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (2012).
93
See, e.g., Study ID 02624, Complaint ID 1848449 (March 24, 2016) (on file with author) (“I was forced
into bankruptcy due to Flagstar.”); Study ID 33215; Complaint ID 1593521 (Oct. 5, 2015) (on file with author)
(“I am now forced to file bankruptcy”); Study ID 46527, Complaint ID 1495359 (July 30, 2015) (on file with
author) (“I finally had to file bankruptcy and lost everything I owned.”).
94
See, e.g., Study ID 04685, Complaint ID 1823089 (March 8, 2016) (on file with author) (“I have to
now worry about having them come after me . . . or just be forced into bankruptcy!”); Study ID 09280, Complaint
ID 1783549 (Feb. 12, 2016) (on file with author) (“I called and they were very abusive over the phone and hung
up on me when I asked them who they were. I has to file bankruptcy.”); Study ID 59285, Complaint ID 1393648
(March 27, 2015) (on file with author) (“I am getting to the point where I will be obligated to seek other
resolution like litigation or bankruptcy.”).
95
See, e.g., Study ID 08890, Complaint ID 1787818 (Feb. 15, 2016) (on file with author) (discussing job
loss); Study ID 12312, Complaint ID 1761064 (Jan. 27, 2016) (on file with author) (noting that modified
mortgage and then had to file bankruptcy); Study ID 39125, Complaint ID 1550121 (Sept. 3, 2015) (on file with
author) (“[I] had to file Bankruptcy to figure out what to do next.”); Study ID 41182, Complaint ID 1532844
(Aug. 24, 2015) (on file with author) (“My only recourse at this point is to file bankruptcy . . . . I’ve also
considered seeking an attorney to see if there is any legal recourse I can take against the company.”).
96
Study ID 08890, Complaint ID 1787818 (Feb. 15, 2016) (on file with author) (“First and foremost we
have always wanted to pay our mortgage.”).
97
Study ID 01844, Complaint ID 1862573 (April 4, 2016) (on file with author) (claiming that a notice of
default was incorrectly recorded).
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solution.98 In another narrative, the consumer began by describing an email
threatening that the consumer would be “arrested or put in jail for fraud,” then
noted speaking with an attorney about bankruptcy, and ended with an
exculpatory explanation: “[t]his situation was brought on due to a serious
medical condition.”99 Yet another narrative described a consumer’s unsuccessful
attempt to negotiate with a creditor by trading $1,000 intended for bankruptcy
filing and attorney’s fees to settle the soon-to-be-discharged debt.100
In a few other narratives, consumers specifically affirmed that they had not
filed bankruptcy. These statements also described bankruptcy as a last resort,
and consumers expressed pride in evading the stigmatized option. For example,
after describing a family’s extensive efforts to deal with their debts, one
narrative ended with: “We did everything but bankruptcy.”101
The CFPB complaint narratives admittedly are the thoughts of a small, select
subset of the population dealing with financial troubles. Nonetheless,
consumers’ unprompted discussions of bankruptcy correspond with research
about how people connect their justiciable problems to law, demonstrating the
usefulness of future studies to assess how people with financial problems enter
the legal system. Additionally, narratives that traced people’s journeys from
financial distress to filing bankruptcy stand out for other reasons. These
consumers’ narratives read much like other statements that did not mention
bankruptcy, yet told stories of struggles with debt that that impacted their
survival. Both types of narratives were imbued with the same fear and
sadness.102 The handful of consumers who ended their stories with filing
bankruptcy, however, seemingly realized (or found the courage to use) another
solution for their financial issues, even if bankruptcy proved not to be a panacea.
These results again raise questions about all individuals who struggle
financially, but do not enter the bankruptcy system. Do these people find another
98
See, e.g., Study ID 03312, Complaint ID 1837826 (March 17, 2016) (on file with author) (“My parents,
who have had wonderful credit scores in the past . . . are now considering bankruptcy as a solution, which for us
is a last resort.”); Study ID 14610, Complaint ID 1745642 (Jan. 15, 2016) (on file with author) (“I am a good
person and believe in paying my debts, but the way Wells Fargo has treated me, I don’t think they want me to
keep my home.”); Study ID 59752, Complaint ID 1390462 (April 24, 2015) (on file with author) (“We finally
. . . had to declare bankruptcy. It was not what we wanted to do we worked for years to try and avoid it.”).
99
Study ID 08352, Complaint ID 1792061 (Feb. 17, 2016) (on file with author).
100
Study ID 42080, Complaint ID 1525645 (Aug. 19, 2015) (on file with author).
101
Study ID 58649, Complaint ID 1399329 (May 31, 2015) (on file with author) (“We did everything but
bankruptcy.”); see also Study ID 19045, Complaint ID 1708838 (Dec. 19, 2015) (on file with author) (“I never
filed for bankruptcy.”); Study ID 50301, Complaint ID 1465608 (July 13, 2015) (on file with author) (“I am
trying to prevent filing [bankruptcy].”).
102
See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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way to resolve their financial problems? Or do they languish, struggling with
mounting debts, dealing with the threatened loss of homes, and worrying about
paying for medical care, food, and utilities?103 Again, these questions
demonstrate the need for new research incorporating both individuals who are
currently struggling with debts and those who have successfully navigated their
financial issues.
Not only will surveying these populations answer questions about how
financial problems become socially constructed as legal problems, but it also
should yield insights about what roles law and legal institutions play in
effectuating people’s rights. Greater access to and increased use of the legal
system is not necessarily more productive. Many people may better achieve their
goals through negotiating with their creditors directly, essentially “bargaining in
the shadow of the law.”104
Currently, the CFPB’s complaint mechanism provides the most prominent,
and perhaps the most useful alegal way for people to alert consumer financial
product and service providers about their issues. The fact that complaints
originate from the CFPB may imbue them with an authority that seems to
generally benefit consumers.105 Other less “squeaky wheel” consumers who do
not know about, or are not willing to use the CFBP’s complaint mechanisms,
may receive different, less beneficial treatment.106 The same holds true for other
quasi-legal and non-legal avenues to assert legal rights, such as citing relevant
law, calling upon prominent community members or elected politicians for help,
or simply hammering away until issues are resolved.107 Crucially, the mere fact
that complaint mechanisms and other quasi-legal dispute resolution mechanisms
exist may serve to redirect many would-be legal claims through these channels,

103
See Foohey, et al., Sweatbox, supra note 28, at __ (noting that people indicate they go without
healthcare, food, and utilities while struggling to pay debts before filing bankruptcy).
104
Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce,
88 YALE L.J. 950, 968 (1979); see also Amanda E. Dawsey, et al., Non-Judicial Debt Collection and the
Consumer’s Choice among Repayment, Bankruptcy and Informal Bankruptcy, 87 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1 (2013)
(measuring the impact of state debt collections laws that prohibit debtor harassment by creditors who originated
or purchased defaulted debts on bankruptcy filings).
105
See Angela Littwin, Why Process Complaints? Then and Now, 87 TEMPLE L. REV. 895, 904–27 (2015)
(detailing the CFPB’s complaint mechanism as alternative dispute resolution).
106
See Amy Schmitz, Access to Consumer Remedies in the Squeaky Wheel System, 39 PEPPERDINE L.
REV. 279, 283 (2012) (noting that attending primarily to complaining consumers “allows businesses to ration
remedies and discriminate in favor of sophisticated squeaky wheel consumers with the requisite information and
resources to protect their interests and pursue purchase complaints”).
107
See generally Rory Van Loo, The Corporation as Courthouse, 33 YALE J. REG. 547 (2016) (discussing
businesses’ internal dispute resolution processes).
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so that fewer legal claims are raised through the legal system.108 If this becomes
a pervasive trend, this behavior may weaken the force of law and decrease the
legal system’s legitimacy and impact. Or such channeling may have no such
effect.
These larger questions about legal institutions’ integrity turn on how people
use the legal system to solve justiciable problems—that is, their access to justice.
Understanding how people come to the legal system and how these journeys in
turn affect the force of law and the legal system is complex, both in general and
in the consumer bankruptcy context. But exploring these difficult “front-end”
questions about how people move from financial trouble to legal problem to
filing bankruptcy (or not) is essential to evaluating people’s access to the
bankruptcy system’s benefits.
II. ACCESSING BANKRUPTCY
When thinking about access to justice, perhaps the most frequently raised
question is the extent to which people can assert and effectuate their legal rights
within the legal system. In consumer bankruptcy, once people have decided to
file, their access to justice depends on their ability to find an attorney to help
them do so. Data show that pro se debtors fare considerably worse in the
bankruptcy system as compared to represented debtors. For instance, in a sample
of cases filed pro se in 2007 and 2008, 0.8% of chapter 13 cases and 71.8% of
chapter 7 cases ended in a discharge.109 For comparison, approximately 50% of
all chapter 13 cases and 97% of all chapter 7 cases in the 2007 iteration of the
CBP resulted in a discharge.110 Perhaps because people understand that filing
with the help of an attorney is vital, or perhaps because bankruptcy is technically
daunting, the vast majority of debtors retain an attorney.111
Although the cost of retaining an attorney is not the sole or even primary
reason that people do not assert their legal rights,112 once people come to
understand their problems as legal problems, attorneys’ fees undoubtedly factor
into their ability to effectuate their legal rights. For people facing financial
problems, in particular, it may be hard to find money to pay a bankruptcy

108
See Katherine Porter, The Complaint Conundrum: Thoughts on the CFPB’s Complaint Mechanism, 7
BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 57, 82–85 (2012) (discussing whether the CFPB’s “complaint system will
improve the overall consumer protection framework”).
109
See Lupica, note 11, at 64.
110
See Foohey, et al., No Money Down, supra note 18, at 1093 tbl 5.
111
See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
112
See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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attorney.113 Indeed, prior research has shown that the timing of consumer
bankruptcy filings track when people receive their tax refunds and paychecks,
leading to the conclusion that people have to “save up” for bankruptcy, initially
accumulating emotional resources, and then financial assets.114
The issue of how people find the funds to pay their attorneys intersects with
perhaps the most enduring issue of access to justice in consumer bankruptcy:
substantial regional disparities in the proportion of households filing chapter 7
or chapter 13. Chapter choice determines a household’s experience while in
bankruptcy and post-bankruptcy. In chapter 7, debtors give up all their nonexempt property in exchange for a discharge of most of their debts. Almost all
chapter 7 cases end in a discharge, typically four to six months after filing. In
chapter 13, people retain all their property, and, in exchange, pay all their
“disposable income” to fund a repayment plan that lasts three to five years. Once
they complete the plan, they receive a discharge of most of their debts. Data
from the Current CBP show that about half of households that file chapter 13
receive a discharge, including those cases that ended with a discharge after they
were converted to chapter 7.115
Since the beginning of systematic empirical research into the consumer
bankruptcy system, most prominently by the original CBP co-investigators
(Teresa Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren, and Jay Westbrook), scholars have
identified and commented on the bankruptcy system’s “local legal culture” in
terms of what chapter households file.116 In some regions of the country, such as
Idaho and Indiana, most households file under chapter 7. In other areas of the
country, such as Alabama, Georgia, and Texas, most households file under
chapter 13.117 Although as a matter of law the Bankruptcy Code leaves chapter
choice mostly up to debtors, this research suggests that debtors’ “choices” are

113

See Study ID 51768, Complaint ID 1451772 (July 6, 2015) (on file with author).
See Mann & Porter, supra note 42, at 319–24 (detailing the “tax refund effect” and “paycheck effect”
on filing patterns).
115
See supra note 110 and accompanying text; Foohey, et al., No Money Down, supra note 18, at 1061–
63 (detailing and contrasting chapters 7 and 13).
116
See generally TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE
FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS: AMERICAN IN DEBT (2000); TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY
LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, AS WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY AND CONSUMER CREDIT IN AMERICA
(1989); Braucher, supra note 43; see also supra notes 23, 24 and accompanying text; DAVID T. STANLEY &
MARJORIE L. GIRTH, BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEMS, PROCESS, REFORM 74–76 (1971) (documenting a wide variation
in chapter XIII rates—the chapter of the Bankruptcy Act that became chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code—
among seven districts studied).
117
See Caseload Statistics Data Tables, supra note 1.
114
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guided by system actors, namely attorneys.118 Regional disparities in chapter 7
and 13 filing rates have persisted for decades, as is evident through scholarship
incorporating data from successive CBP iterations.119
Later research built upon these results by adding debtors’ race to the analysis
of disparities in chapter choice. Relying on data gathered since 1991, studies
have shown that black households are over-represented in chapter 13, regardless
of where they are located, and that this disparity persists after controlling for
factors that would counsel filing under chapter 13.120 Stated differently, black
households are much more likely to file chapter 13 as compared to similarlysituated households of other demographics. The racial demographics of chapter
choice become even more significant considering that 2007 CBP data show that
black households are 17% less likely to receive a discharge in chapter 13 than
other similarly-situated households.121
To explore what may influence the racial disparity in chapter choice, Jean
Braucher, Dov Cohen, and Robert Lawless conducted a study in which they sent
a vignette to consumer bankruptcy attorneys across the country that asked the
attorney to select a bankruptcy chapter for a hypothetical couple with a mix of
financial circumstances that made counseling filing chapter 7 or 13 equally
plausible. The vignettes varied on two items: the couple’s names (“Reggie and
Latisha,” “Todd and Allison,” and no names), and whether the couple indicated
they were leaning toward filing chapter 7 or 13.122 The results suggest that
attorneys may guide chapter choice in a way that connects with racial
118
See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Local Legal Culture and the Fear of Abuse, 6 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV.
25, 30 (1998) (discussing who exercises “the ‘choices’ given to debtors”).
119
See Foohey, No Money Down, supra note 18, at 1063; Chrystin Ondersma, Are Debtors Rational
Actors? An Experiment, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 279, 295–303 (2009) (replicating the persistence of local
legal culture with an expanded dataset); see also William C. Whitford, Small Ball, 90 TEX. L. REV. 9, 16–18
(2011) (finding that the percentage of chapter 13 cases filed across districts has remained constant from 1993 to
2010).
120
See Jean Braucher, Dov Cohen & Robert M. Lawless, Race, Attorney Influence, and Bankruptcy
Chapter Choice, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 393, 406 (2012) (relying on data from the 2007 CBP to find that
black households were more likely to file under chapter 13 as compared to similar other households); Dov
Cohen, Robert M. Lawless & Faith Shin, Opposite of Correct: Inverted Insider Perceptions of Race and
Bankruptcy, 91 AM. BANKR. L.J. 623, 631 (2017) (relying on CBP data from cases filed in 2013, 2014, and 2015
to replicate findings based on 2007 CBP data about racial disparities in chapter choice); Robert M. Chapman,
Missing Persons: Social Science and Accounting for Race, Gender, Class and Marriage in Bankruptcy, 76 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 347, 387 (2002) (using data from the 1991 CBP to find that black households were over-represented
in consumer bankruptcy, but not in chapter 7); Rory Van Loo, A Tale of Two Debtors: Bankruptcy Disparities
by Race, 72 ALB. L. REV. 231, 234 (2009) (relying on data from the 2001 CBP to find that 61.8% of black
households filed chapter 13).
121
Sara S. Greene, Parina Patel & Katherine Porter, Cracking the Code: An Empirical Analysis of
Consumer Bankruptcy Outcomes, 101 MINN. L. REV. 1031, 1060, 1086–87 (2017).
122
Braucher, et al., supra note 120, at 405–08 (describing the vignette).
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disparity.123 Attorneys were twice as likely to recommend that “Reggie and
Latisha” file under chapter 13 as attorneys who counseled “Todd and
Allison.”124 And attorneys were more likely to indicate that they thought the
white couple leaning toward filing chapter 7 had “good values” and was
competent, while attorneys were more likely to indicate that the black couple
that preferred chapter 13 had “good values” and was competent.125
Another study conducted by Dov Cohen, Robert Lawless, and Faith Shin,
based on a survey of a nationally-representative sample of attorneys about racial
disparity in chapter choice, found that attorneys’ beliefs about debtor’s chapter
choice is opposite of actual trends in percentages of chapter 13 filings from black
and white household.126 Although this result suggests that attorneys do not
recognize that their actions may contribute to racial disparities in chapter
choice—which would align with implicit bias research127—it does not change
the fact that attorneys may influence chapter choice decisions such that
disparities emerge.
Bankruptcy attorneys also have a monetary interest in chapter choice.
Attorneys charge more to assist with a chapter 13 filing than a chapter 7 filing.
Based on Current CBP data, attorneys charge an average of $1,224 to file and
represent a debtor in chapter 7, and an average of $3,442 to file and represent a
debtor in chapter 13.128 Because of Code section language providing attorney
payment, as well as a Supreme Court decision interpreting that language,
attorneys require their clients filing chapter 7 to pay attorneys’ fees before filing,
but can allow their clients filing chapter 13 to pay attorneys’ fees as part of the
repayment plan.129
This leads to what my co-authors and I termed “no money down”
bankruptcy—filing chapter 13 without paying any attorneys’ fees before
filing—as contrasted with all other chapter 13 cases, which we termed
123
But see Edward R. Morrison & Antoine Uetwiller, Consumer Bankruptcy Pathologies, 173 J.
INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 174 (2017) (using a sample of chapter 7 and 13 cases from Cook County,
Illinois to find that the same racial disparity in chapter choice, but attributing much of the disparity to parking
tickets and government fines that were dischargeable in chapter 13, but not chapter 7).
124
Braucher, et al., supra note 120, at 411–13.
125
Id. at 413–16.
126
Cohen, et al, supra note 120, at 638. The authors surveyed bankruptcy attorneys before they published
the results of their initial work on the racial disparity in chapter choice.
127
See A. Mechele Dickerson, Racial Steering in Bankruptcy, 20 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 623, 643–47
(2012) (discussing racial stereotyping and implicit bias).
128
Foohey, et al., Sweatbox, supra note 28, at __.
129
See Foohey, et al., No Money Down, supra note 18, at 1066–67 (discussing 11 U.S.C. § 330 and the
effects of Lamie v. United States Trustee, 540 U.S. 526 (2004)).
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“traditional” chapter 13.130 Based on data from the 2007 CBP and Current CBP,
we found that “no money down” bankruptcy is reshaping the consumer
bankruptcy system. Between 2007 and 2015, the percentage of “no money
down” chapter 13 cases filed increased by 25%.131 We also found that two
factors determine whether households will file “no money down” cases: where
they live and their race.132 Controlling for other relevant factors, we also found
that, as the rate of chapter 13 filings increased in any given district, the
percentage of cases filed as “no money down” chapter 13 cases also increased,
as did the racial disparity in chapter choice in that district.133 This suggests that
much of the racial disparity in chapter choice in districts with high percentages
of chapter 13 cases is attributable to “no money down” chapter 13 bankruptcy.134
It also provides some evidence of a link between “local legal culture” and the
racial disparity in chapter choice. Significantly, we could not identify any
legitimate reasons why place of residence or race would correlate with debtors’
need for chapter 13’s substantive legal benefits. Instead, “no money down”
bankruptcy emerges as a breakdown in access to justice—more so for black
households, but also for many households, regardless of demographics.
Since the publication of “No Money Down” Bankruptcy, two studies have
expanded on its conclusions. First, in a piece written for ProPublica, Paul Kiel
and Hannah Fresques conducted an in-depth analysis of two districts with stark
racial disparities in chapter choice: the Northern District of Illinois and the
Western District of Tennessee.135 They found that a few law offices in each
district filed most of the chapter 13 cases, and that in Tennessee, chapter 13 cases
were “nearly or always” filed with “no money down.”136
Second, Robert Lawless and Angela Littwin combined data from the Census
Bureau with a database maintained by the Federal Judicial Center that contains
information on every bankruptcy case filed between fiscal years 2012 and

130

Id. at 1074.
Id. at 1074–75.
132
Id. at 1080–82.
133
Id. at 1084–91 (discussing the multinomial regression and its results).
134
Id. at 1090.
135
Paul Kiel & Hannah Fresques, Data Analysis: Bankruptcy and Race in America, PROPUBLICA (Sept.
27, 2017), https://projects.propublica.org/graphics/bankruptcy-data-analysis; see also Paul Kiel & Hannah
Fresques, How the Bankruptcy System is Failing Black Americans, PROPUBLICA (Sept. 27, 2017),
https://features.propublica.org/bankruptcy-inequality/bankruptcy-failing-black-americans-debt-chapter-13/.
136
Kiel & Fresques, Data Analysis, supra note 135. As to Illinois, the authors found that many black
households filed chapter 13 to deal with possible driver’s license suspensions, which accords with Morrison’s
and Uetwiller’s results, supra note 123.
131
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2016137 with the goal of studying chapter choice on both the judicial district and
community levels.138 This strategy allowed them to begin to disentangle the
“local” versus the “legal” in “local legal culture.” In line with previous research,
they concluded that case characteristics (such as home ownership), race, and
judicial district were the only variables associated with chapter choice.139
Adding judicial district to the community level analysis, they further found that
only one variable significantly predicted chapter choice—race, as measured by
the racial composition of the debtor’s zip code.140 These results strongly suggest
that it is “legal” rather than “local” variables that influence the racial disparity
in chapter choice.141
With this latest study’s results, the conclusion becomes even clearer: to
improve access to justice in consumer bankruptcy, reforms must focus on legal
professionals. Future empirical research may expand upon these studies’
findings with targeted analyses to assess the inter-connected roles of legal
professionals.142 But given the increasing evidence that professionals guide
clients’ choices among chapter 7, “no money down” chapter 13, and
“traditional” chapter 13, a central focus of research now must be how best to
incentivize system actors to examine their behaviors. Challenging the status quo
is difficult, particularly because people often balk at the suggestion that their
actions may perpetuate racism.143 One way to encourage attorneys, trustee, and
judges to confront and consider their biases is to provide easily-implementable
ways for them to track their clients and the cases that appear before them, such
as spreadsheets.144 For instance, popular software, such as Best Case
Bankruptcy, could include features that allow for downloading and simple data
analysis.145
Research about the persistence of biases, however, suggests that such efforts
may not be sufficient to combat systemic disparities. Another tactic is to change
the Code itself. These changes, of course, will be harder to implement.
Nonetheless, for the sake of discussion, potential reforms might start with

137
Integrated Database (IDB), FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, https://www.fjc.gov/research/idb (last visited
Apr. 26, 2018).
138
Robert M. Lawless & Angela Littwin, Local Legal Culture from R2D2 to Big Data, 96 TEX. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2018) (draft dated Feb. 2018) (on file with author).
139
Id.
140
Id.
141
Id.
142
See id. (discussing ideas for future research).
143
See Dickerson, supra note 127, at 647–48 (discussing implicit bias).
144
Id. (proposing a “Lawyer’s Memo to Self: I May Be Giving Biased Advice”).
145
BEST CASE BANKRUPTCY, https://www.bestcase.com/ (last visited Feb. 12, 2018).
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changes to the timing of the payment of attorneys’ fees in chapter 7,
requirements for chapter 13 plan confirmation, and simplifying chapter 7 to
make pro se filing more plausible.146 Eliminating the choice between chapter 7
and chapter 13 is a place to end—the discussion of which ended seemingly once
and for all with BAPCPA’s passage.147
Finally, an intermediate tactic is to appeal to bankruptcy judges. Bankruptcy
judges promulgate standing orders that assist attorneys in setting fees and seem
to effectuate “no money down” bankruptcy.148 They also are the ultimate arbiters
of chapter 13 plan confirmation, as well as case dismissal and conversion. And
perhaps most significantly for changing “local legal culture” from the inside out,
judges can influence how bankruptcy trustees evaluate cases, which
consequently influences how debtors’ attorneys shape their law practices.149
CONCLUSION
To evaluate access to justice in the context of consumer bankruptcy, there
are two key questions to consider: how do people think about their financial
problems as legal problems addressable by filing bankruptcy, and to what extent
debtors can effectuate their legal rights in bankruptcy. More research is needed
to understand how people come to think of law as a way to deal with their
financial problems. In contrast, research shows and reaffirms that the consumer
bankruptcy system suffers from racial and regional disparities that negatively
impact access to justice. Short of legislative changes, attention now should be
paid to shifting consumer bankruptcy’s culture.
However, when thinking about access to justice, it is crucial to recognize
that bankruptcy is not a panacea for all or even most financial troubles. Racial
disparities persist outside of bankruptcy across consumer financial products and
services,150 widening income inequality prevents families from getting ahead,151

146

Foohey, et al., No Money Down, supra note 18, at 1103–05 (detailing these ideas).
See William Whitford, The Ideal of Individualized Justice: Consumer Bankruptcy As Consumer
Protection, and Consumer Protection in Consumer Bankruptcy, 68 AM. BANK. L.J. 397 (1994); William
Whitford, Has the Time Come to Repeal Chapter 13, 65 IND. L.J. 85 (1989).
148
Foohey, et al., No Money Down, supra note 18, at 1068–69 (discussing standing orders).
149
See Westbrook, supra note 118, at 30 (noting the interplay of system actors).
150
See Pamela Foohey, Lender Discrimination, Black Churches, and Bankruptcy, 54 HOUS. L. REV. 1079,
1096–98 (2017) (discussing how blacks pay more for financial products).
151
See Heather Long, U.S. Inequality Keeps Getting Uglier, CNN MONEY (Dec. 22, 2016),
http://money.cnn.com/2016/12/22/news/economy/us-inequality-worse/index.html.
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and companies continue to violate consumer protection laws.152 Many of the
financial issues that Americans face are better addressed outside of bankruptcy,
including with the help of states and cities, which may prevent people from
needing to file bankruptcy.153 But once consumers turn to bankruptcy, attorneys,
judges, and trustees have a responsibility to ensure that the system itself does
not compound the financial problems people face outside of bankruptcy.

152
In its first five years, the CFPB returned more than $11.7 billion to Americans. See Ian Salisbury, The
CFPB Turns 5 Today. Here’s What It’s Done (and What It Hasn’t), TIME (July 21, 2016)
http://time.com/money/4412754/cfpb-5-year-anniversary-accomplishments/.
153
See Susan Block-Lieb, Cities as a Source of Consumers’ Financial Empowerment, 34 EMORY BANKR.
DEV. J. 387 (2018).

